

APPEAL NO. 033060  
FILED DECEMBER 30, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 28, 2003. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury with a date of injury of \_\_\_\_\_. The claimant appeals the adverse determination. The respondent (carrier) responds, urging affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The claimant had the burden to prove that she sustained a compensable injury. The claimant claimed that she sustained a repetitive trauma injury as a result of performing her work activities for the employer. She had just returned to light duty after sustaining a compensable right upper extremity injury, and she testified that repetitive work with her left arm and hand caused her to sustain a new compensable injury to her left upper extremity. Section 401.011(34) provides that an occupational disease includes a repetitive trauma injury, which is defined in Section 401.011(36). The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). We conclude that the hearing officer's determination on the disputed issue is supported by sufficient evidence and that it is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Thus, no sound basis exists for us to disturb that determination on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). Although another fact finder may have drawn different inferences from the evidence, which would have supported a different result, that fact does not provide a basis for us to reverse the hearing officer's decision on appeal. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING, PENNSYLVANIA** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION SYSTEM  
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET  
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

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Michael B. McShane  
Appeals Panel  
Manager/Judge

CONCUR:

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Gary L. Kilgore  
Appeals Judge

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Thomas A. Knapp  
Appeals Judge